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Abstract 
Studies to date have shown that income concentration for the top 1% income 
share, the super-rich, has increased conspicuously in the 21st century. However, there is 
insufficient knowledge on how political factors and types of human capital influence 
income concentration. Using cross-country data from this century, I provide empirical 
evidence that shows that democracy and cognitive skill are negatively correlated to the 
top 1% income share. 
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Highlights 
 
 Cross-country data from the 21st century were used to examine top 1% 
income share. 
 Democracy was found to reduce the top 1% income share. 
 Cognitive skill was also found to reduce the top 1% income share. 
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1. Introduction 
Piketty (2014) triggered significant controversy about the concentration of 
wealth in a market economy. Not only have policymakers and economists paid a great 
deal of attention to the issue of inequality, but this has become a leading and hotly 
debated topic across the world. Piketty (2014) argued that income inequality has 
become increasingly concentrated among a handful of individuals during the 21st 
century. This phenomenon sharply contradicts the Kuznets curve; the inverted U-shape 
hypothesis advocated by Kuznets (1955) concerning changes of economic inequality. 
According to Piketty (2014), the concentration of wealth is considered the 
primary outcome of capitalism. This can undermine democratic values and increase 
conflict between rich and poor groups, resulting in social unrest (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2000). The large externality caused by concentration of wealth cannot be 
overlooked. Conversely, it is widely acknowledged that the market mechanism 
(capitalism) has substantially contributed to society-wide increases in wealth. The 
market mechanism both positively and negatively influences society. It is necessary to 
consider how to reduce the negative effects and increase the positive ones. For this 
purpose, by using cross-country data this paper attempts to assess democracy and 
human capital in relation to the share of total income in a country received by the top 
1% of individuals in the 21st century. 
 
2. Data and Model  
Definitions and basic statistics of variables used in this paper are provided in Table 1. 
Economic policy, such as income redistribution, is formed through political processes. 
Citizens’ participation in this process evidently influences income concentration. 
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Productivity of less-educated people increases when they obtain education. Therefore, 
income concentration is thought to depend on democracy and human capital. Other 
socioeconomic factors are also considered to influence income concentration. To 
ascertain the determinants of the top 1% share income, the estimated function takes the 
following reduced form: 
 
Top income sharei = 0 + 1Democracyi+ 2Cognitive skilli, + 3Fractionalizationi +4GDPi + 
5Legal_UKi + 6Legal_GEi + 7Legal_FRi + 8Catholici +9 Protesti + ui, 
Each country is represented by i. The dependent variable is Top income share. The 
World Top Incomes Database compiled by Alvaredo et al. (2014) provided the data for 
the top 1% income share from the 20th century
1
. I restrict the focus to income 
concentration after from 2000. Therefore, in this paper, the average value of the top 1% 
income share in each country from 2000 is calculated and then used for estimation
2
,
3
. A 
list of countries included in the sample can be found in the Appendix. The main 
independent variables of interest are the degree of democracy and cognitive skill. Higher 
democracy values indicate a country’s higher level of democracy. Similarly, higher 
cognitive skill values indicate a higher such level for the country’s citizens. 
Democracy is thought to make society more transparent and decrease illicit profits. 
Cognitive skill acquired through education is important to increase earnings for 
individuals who have grown up in low income households. Both of these factors can 
lead to a decrease in inequality. Therefore, democracy, cognitive skill and schooling are 
                                                   
1
 The covered period varies by country. In some countries, such as Denmark and Norway, data can 
be obtained from the full 20th century. However, data for Columbia and China can be obtained only 
from the 1980s or 1990s. 
2
 Due to limitations of data availability in Alavaredo et al. (2014), the number of years used for 
calculating the average top 1% income share varies according to the country. 
3
 Atkinson and Piketty (2007) showed how the top 1% income share in each country was calculated. 
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expected to be inversely correlated with the share of income among the top 1%. 
Additionally, I include several socioeconomic control variables: Alesina and Glaeser 
(2004, Chapter 6) provided evidence that ethnic fractionalization is negatively related to 
social welfare spending. They interpret it as “human beings are just less sympathetic to 
people who are different from them” (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, p. 177). From this, 
income redistribution policy is unlikely to be preferred in ethnic fractionalized country. 
Hence, the top 1% income share increases. To examine this, ethnic fractionalization is 
included. To grasp the degree of economic development, per capita GDP is included. 
Dummies for legal origins and proxies for religion are included for capturing 
institutional and social features. 
 
3. Results 
      Estimation results are reported in Table 2. Owing to data limitations, only 25 
countries are represented. Table 2 shows that democracy has a negative coefficient and 
is statistically significant level in all columns. This indicates there is less income 
concentrated in the top 1% income group in more democratic countries. Likewise, 
cognitive skill also has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant in all 
columns. The results provide empirical evidence that the higher the cognitive skill 
among a country’s citizens, the less that income is concentrated in the top 1% income 
group. However, schooling is not statistically significant in any columns, so years of 
schooling do not affect the degree of concentration. The estimation results indicate that 
democracy and cognitive skill improved by education can be regarded as an effective 
tool for restraining concentration of wealth in the hands of a few wealthy individuals. 
Fractionalization has the predicted positive sign but it is not statistically significant in 
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any columns. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Using cross-country data, this paper examines the influence of political and 
institutional factors and cognitive skill of citizens on the top 1% income share. This 
paper provides empirical evidence that democracy and cognitive skill are negatively 
correlated to the amount of income in the top 1%. This implies that fostering democracy 
and increasing cognitive skill acquired by citizens play a key role in maintaining 
stability of modern society by reducing negative externality caused by extreme income 
inequality. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
TOP Share
a
 Average top 1% income share after 2001 
in each country (%) 
11.1 3.47 
Democracy
b
 Degree of democracy 
Value range from 0 (less democratic) to 
11 (democratic) 
8.27 
 
2.76 
Cognitive skill
c 
IQ value of Lynn in 2002
 c 
Method of calculation is provided in 
Russell and Cohn (2012) 
96.8 
 
6.54 
Schooling
d 
Average years of schooling in 2000   
Fractionalization 
e
  Ethnic fractionalization 
 
0.19 0.21 
GDP
a 
Per capita income in 2000  
(in thousand US dollars) 
25.9 12.1 
Legal_UK
b
 This is 1 if a country is UK legal origin, 
otherwise 0. 
0.36 --- 
Legal_GE
b
 This is 1 if a country is German legal 
origin, otherwise 0. 
0.12 --- 
Legal_FR
b
 This is 1 if a country French legal 
origin, otherwise 0.  
0.36 --- 
Catholic
b
 Share of Catholic citizens in 1980 (%). 
 
39.4 37.0 
Notes: a) Sourced from Alvaredo et al. (2014) 
b) Sourced from website of Andrei Shleifer. http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset 
(accessed February 2010) 
c) Sourced from Russell and Cohn (2012) 
d) Sourced from Morrison and Murtin (2009). Available at www.fabricemurtin.com 
e) Sourced from website of Marta Reynal-Querol. http://www.econ.upf.edu/~reynal/data_web.htm. 
accessed Jan 10, 2012). 
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Table 2. Determinants of top 1% income share (OLS Model) 
 (1)  (2) (3) 
Democracy −0.60* 
(−2.09) 
−0.47* 
(−1.81) 
−0.51* 
(−1.99) 
Cognitive skill
 −0.25* 
(−1.85) 
−0.28* 
(−1.90) 
−0.24* 
(−1.92) 
Schooling 0.52 
(0.71) 
0.93 
(1.01) 
0.53 
(0.80) 
GDP
 0.03 
(0.71) 
−0.03 
(−0.21) 
0.04 
(0.32) 
Fractionalization 0.25 
(0.11) 
1.75 
(0.71) 
1.08 
(0.44) 
Legal_UK 3.46 
(1.29) 
1.85 
(0.78) 
3.39** 
(2.22) 
Legal_GE 3.86* 
(1.85) 
2.08 
(1.34) 
3.32** 
(2.93) 
Legal_FR 1.07 
(0.57) 
0.61 
(0.27) 
2.59 
(2.30) 
Catholic 0.002 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(1.19) 
 
Europe dummy 
 
1.06 
(0.45) 
  
America dummy 
 
5.67*** 
(3.19) 
  
Asia dummy 
 
−0.77 
(−0.34) 
  
Constant 30.8 *** 
(3.60) 
29.9*** 
(3.48) 
29.5*** 
(3.60) 
Adjusted R-square
 
0.62 0.22 0.21 
Obs. 24 24 24 
Notes: Values in parentheses are t-statistics obtained by robust standard error. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Appendix 
Number country 
1 Argentina 
2 Australia 
3 Canada 
4 Denmark 
5 Finland 
6 France 
7 Germany 
8 Indonesia 
9 Ireland 
10 Italy 
11 Japan 
12 Malaysia 
13 Netherlands 
14 New Zealand 
15 Norway 
16 Portugal 
17 Singapore 
18 South Africa 
19 Spain 
20 Sweden 
21 Switzerland 
22 UK 
23 USA 
24 Uruguay 
 
 
